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SYSTEMATIZING POLICY LEARNING: FROM MONOLITHS TO DIMENSIONS 




The field of policy learning is characterised by a proliferation of concepts and lack of systematic 
findings. Our collation of studies of learning in the political science literature reveals the presence of 
many different dimensions and approaches. To systematize them, we combine the classic Sartorian 
approach to classification with the more recent insights on explanatory typology. At the outset, we 
classify per genus et differentiam – distinguishing between the genus and the different species within 
it. We then draw on the technique of explanatory typologies to introduce a basic model of policy 
learning, capturing the four major genera identified in the literature. We then generate variation 
within each cell by using rigorous concepts drawn from adult education research. Specifically, we 
conceptualize learning as control over the contents and goals of knowledge. By looking at learning 
through the lenses of knowledge utilization, we show that the basic model can be expanded to reveal 
sixteen different species. These types are all conceptually established in the literature, but up until 
now the scope conditions and connections among types have not been clarified. Our reconstruction of 
the field sheds light on mechanisms and relations associated with alternatives operationalizations of 
learning and the role of actors in the process of knowledge construction and utilization. By providing 
a comprehensive typology, we aim to lay the foundations for the systematic comparison across and 
within cases of policy learning. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
In this article, we critically reflect on the state of policy learning: there has been a proliferation of 
concepts and models, with the result that different strands of the literature, both in international 
relations and in political science, tend to talk past each other. We suggest a way forward by blending 
the classic Sartorian approach to classification with recent work on typologies in qualitative research 
(Sartori, 1970; Collier at al. 2008; Elman, 2005; George and Bennett 2005, chp.11). We build an 
explanatory typology that shows the connections and scope conditions for different forms of learning. 
Debates in this field resemble the classic ships crossing in the night because scholars have failed to 
sort out and clarify concepts, and the relationships between them. Our proposal revolves around the 
distinction between four major ‘genera’ of learning and the ‘species’ within each ‘genus’. 
At the outset, however, we have to define learning as updating of beliefs. In public policy, we 
are eminently concerned with beliefs about policies – whether it is the ideas that underpin them, their 
performance or the governance mechanisms and institutions of policymaking. This process of 
updating beliefs can be the result of social interaction, appraisals of one's experience (often of failure) 
or evidence-based analysis – or most likely a mix of the three. This minimal definition enables us to 
handle the entire literature we refer to in the remainder of the article.  
There is renewed interest in policy learning, as shown by three special issues published in 
2009 – two on diffusion and transfer (Dolowitz, 2009; Evans, 2009 respectively) and the third on the 
EU as learning organisation (Zito and Schout, 2009a). Further, some of the most popular frameworks 
developed since the early 1990s, such as policy transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996), the epistemic 
communities approach (Haas, 1992) and the advocacy coalitions framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith, 1993; Sabatier and Weible, 2007), have emerged from the attempt to generate theoretical 
propositions about learning in domestic and international policy domains. 
Yet, even the most casual of observers would note that the field is struggling to produce 
cumulative knowledge on this topic. The analysis of learning – a classic topic since Deutsch (1966), 
Simon (1947, 1957) and, soon after, Heclo (1974) and Lindblom (1965, but see also the seminal work 
on muddling through, 1959) – has taken place within several self-contained sub-fields where there is 
empirical progress but relatively little interest in conversations across the discipline. At the same time, 
theoretical models (for example, Volden et al, 2008) have not as yet fully connected with the work of 
empirical analysts, perhaps with the exception of the field of policy diffusion (Graham et al, 2008; 
Meseguer, 2009; Weyland, 2005). The literature on governance has also added to the interest of the 
last fifteen years or so in re-discovering the analytical properties of learning, with emphasis on the 
organisational-institutional properties that generate learning outcomes (Eising, 2002; Olsen and 
Peters, 1996), the notion of experimentalist-democratic polyarchies (Gerstenberg and Sabel, 2002), 
varieties of principal-agent models (Author A, 2010, Author A and colleague, 2007; Waterman and 
Meier, 1998), epistemic structures in international governance regimes (Author A, 2009; Haas, 1992), 
and models of bargaining and mutual adjustment (Elgström and Jönsson, 2000). At the micro-level, 
researchers have worked on models of the mind, rationality and emotions, and how individuals get 
locked-in by persuasion, majority opinions, and other characteristics of group behaviour (Denzau and 
North, 1994). 
Finally, international organisations are engaged in a debate with strong normative 
assumptions about how governments should learn. They have launched different instruments for 
cross-national and trans-national learning, such as benchmarking, peer review, checklists, and 
'facilitated coordination' (Author B, 2004). Such normative concerns are refracted by academic studies 
on lesson-drawing (Rose, 1991), extrapolation (Barzelay, 2007), and benchmarking (Schäfer, 2006). 
This intellectual activity is still very fluid, with limited cumulative knowledge (Author B, 
2009). Recent reviews of the state of the art (Dobbin et al, 2007; Freeman, 2006; Grin and Loeber, 
2007) contain only a handful of empirical studies, thus making it difficult to assess what we may 
collectively learn about this topic. This perhaps explains the general feeling of disappointment (Egan, 
2009; James and Lodge, 2003; Volden et al., 2008). We still know little about how communities of 
policy-makers learn in real-world setting (Freeman, 2006, 2007). 
Thus, we need to step back a bit in order to sort out and systematize this intellectual activity 
and create the pre-conditions for cumulative knowledge. Interestingly, both Dolowitz (2009) and 
Boswell (2008) say we should focus on knowledge utilization to overcome some of the problems. We 
shall follow up on this suggestion. The article is organized step-by-step. In section one, we present a 
scattered plot of the literature. This plot does not make sense, because it provides some mind-boggling 
eleven dimensions of learning! Not all dimensions are on the same level of the ladder of abstraction: 
some are major themes in the literature, others are variations within the theme. By using the tools of 
concept formation and explanatory typologies (Sartori, 1970; Elman, 2005), in section two we 
separate the individual genus from the species within the genus. We build four genera by combining 
two variables – problem tractability and actor certification. Then, in section three, we expand the 
property space within each genus by considering the fundamental dimension of control over 
knowledge production (see Author A, 2009). Such 'expansion of the property space' (Elman, 2005) 
leads us to sixteen species of learning, and enables us to show the relationships between species and 
the conditions for one genus of learning and another. We conclude with a discussion of the usage of 
typologies and suggestions for future research. 
 
1. CONCEPTUALIZING POLICY LEARNING 
Learning has been examined in many different ways in public policy. By using different search 
options in the ISI social science citation index we identified some 833 articles from the main sub-
fields of political science
i
. After sifting these down to 86, we then added books and articles that are 
concerned with learning but do not show up in the social science citation index.  
The first step in systematizing the field is to plot the articles on an n-dimensional space, 
where the n-dimensions are theoretically justified. This is not possible for a large majority of the 
articles, which belong to the ‘null dimension’ of not having any theoretical depth. True, some sources 
of theoretical inspiration are mentioned in the introduction – it is for example almost classic to find 
‘evocations’ of Peter Hall’s three types of learning (1993) or of Haas’s epistemic communities (1992). 
But essentially the study remains empirical, and evidence is not used for theory testing or theory 
building. This is not surprising since the whole landscape of policy analysis is still best described by 
few ‘mountain islands of theoretical structure, intermingled with, and occasionally attached together 
by foothills of shared methods and concepts, and empirical work, all of which is surrounded by 
oceans of descriptive work not attached to any mountain of theory’ (Schlager, 1997, p.14). 
What about the papers with some theoretical depth, then? They do not fall neatly in any simple 
n-dimensional space – indeed, an ideal plot would look quite scattered. This is because the 
disciplinary orientation varies markedly, from international relations to public management. If we 
meander through the set of papers, we find several possible dimensions of theoretical spaces. 
Actually, potentially the set of articles generates no less than eleven dimensions, specifically: 
(a) An epistemic dimension, where the learning process can be neatly captured by the asymmetry 
of information with the expert as teacher (Haas, 1992). This does not mean that the 
relationship between expert and policymaker runs smoothly, since there are political reasons 
why epistemic communities construct policy realities of cause and effect, but do not actually 
create them in the real world. But, overall, in epistemic communities model it is clear where 
expertise and policy-relevant knowledge are (i.e. the teacher). 
(b) Epistemic actors, however, can facilitate learning but not contribute to the definition of the 
interests of the policymaker-learner (Author A, 2007; Lindquist, 1992, 1993). This is not the 
original model of epistemic communities, where given high uncertainty, interests cannot be 
defined by policy-makers, who draw on epistemic communities to reduce uncertainty and 
make sense of their preferences. This is a less radical model, with the experts that contributes 
to a learning process where the learner is in control of the goals and mode of knowledge-
production (Author A, 2009). 
(c) We then find a dimension that has yet again something to do with the epistemic teacher. Yet it 
differs profoundly because someone else (not the ‘teacher’) is in control of what and why 
should be learned. Indeed, in these articles, epistemic actors are no longer teachers. They are 
agents whose activities are shaped by policymakers as principals (Author A, 2010, Author A 
and colleague, 2007; Jordan and Greenaway, 1998; Rowe and Shepherd, 2002). This strand of 
research chimes with the work on advocacy think tanks, which in some cases enjoy autonomy 
from the principal, whilst in others can be classified as hired guns (Stone et al, 1998). 
(d) The dimension of delegation, however, does not necessarily revolve around a relation 
between the expert and the policymaker. It is a self-contained lens on processes of power and 
regulation – indeed scholars working in this area do not make systematic references to the 
concept of epistemic communities. What matters in the delegation dimension is that 
knowledge production, utilization and diffusion are organized along a chain of delegation of 
tasks. Learning mechanisms are explained by different asymmetries of information and forms 
of oversight (Thatcher and Stone-Sweet, 2002; Waterman and Meier, 1998). 
(e) A completely different approach breaks with the tradition of learning as a relation between a 
teacher and a pupil, and also with the principal-agent theorizations that see experts as hired 
guns or agents. This is the set of articles concerned with communities or networks of officers, 
elected politicians and civil society organizations that contribute collectively to the learning 
experience by exploring an issue, its meanings, and its political relevance. Richard Freeman 
(2006), for example, has drawn our attention on how communities and networks learn through 
deliberation, arguing that learning how is more important than learning that. 
(f) Connected to this perspective, yet more oriented to purposeful action under conditions of 
manipulability of social representations is the dimension of issue framing, especially when 
there is an over-arching goal (Daviter, 2007; Grin and van De Graf, 1996). 
(g) The experimental dimension amplifies some of the themes of issue framing and deliberative 
learning in networks. But here ‘learning’ is a broad category, almost synonymous of mode of 
governance (Lenoble and De Shutter, 2010; Sabel and Zeitlin, 2008). It covers experimental 
processes of trial-and-error with different forms of know-how and policy instruments, where 
Bayesian learning leads to the type of content that best fits a predefined preference 
(Moynihan, 2005). In turn, these processes lead to reflexive social learning (Sanderson, 2002, 
2009) and discursive transformations of public policy (Fischer, 2003; Schmidt, 2002). 
(h) Yet another set of scholars sees learning as either intentional or, more often, un-intentional 
by-product of bargaining. Actors bargain to meet standards and targets. Sometimes they are in 
control of the goals and content of knowledge production. Sometimes they act under 
constraints. An example is provided by the conditionality literature – the literature has shown 
that 'smart' and 'clever' solutions are facilitated by the imperatives of conditionality 
(Weisband, 2000). 
(i) Purposeful action can be more severely constrained when actors engage in learning and 
choose what to learn to deliver a pre-determined preference (Cram, 1993; Dolowitz, 1997; 
Grossback et al, 2004). The goals of knowledge production and utilization are entirely 
exogenous in this dimension and learning strategic. 
(j) This leads us to another dimension of structured interaction among policymakers. Here there 
is a constellation of actors that perceive the need to make marginal improvement at the level 
of the tools of government and the instruments of public policy (Meseguer, 2005). What 
matters here is the scope of learning, rather than its modes. In fact, although the scope is 
limited, learning modes can be of different types, such as emulation, rational decoding of 
foreign experiences, or Bayesian learning. In this literature the major emphasis is on diffusion 
as outcome and learning as mechanism (of diffusion) (Gilardi, 2008; Meseguer, 2005, 
Meseguer and Escribà-Abel, 2011). Recent research in this field differentiates between the 
diffusion of instrumental learning (that is, learning about substantive policy improvement) 
and political learning (that is, learning about forms of policy change that are electorally 
rewarding) (Gilardi, 2010). 
(k) Finally, we found a way of looking at learning in constellations of actors that interact in 
loosely-coupled organizations or policy arenas. It is difficult to predict how learning can 
occur, and when it takes place – indeed some of these studies infer learning dynamics from 
process-tracing (Arrowsmith et al, 2004). 
 
 
2. IDENTIFYING FOUR LEARNING GENERA 
What are the common themes and patterns running through these types? We cannot afford to violate 
pre-requisites of parsimony and generate a theoretical space with eleven dimensions. Actually, the 
problem is more serious than a violation of parsimony. From the previous discussion, it is obvious 
that not all dimensions are on the same level in the proverbial ladder of abstraction (Sartori, 1970). 
Some are abstract categories, others are more concrete specifications of these categories. Put 
differently, we have to classify per genus et differentiam in the tradition of Aristotle and (in political 
science) Sartori. We have to identify the genus first. Then we look at the variation (the differentia) 
that really matters in order to create the species. Once we understand this pattern, we can correctly 
classify two studies of the same genus in different species. In qualitative research design, this is 
equivalent to building an explanatory typology first and then expanding the property space (Elman, 
2005). Four genera are proposed below. 
1. Arguably, learning as a product of reflexive learning is a major type or genus. Learning is 
often characterised as ‘deep’ or ‘thick’ because it is the major mechanism through which 
preferences are explored and reinforced. In turn, such explorations bring about the outcomes 
described by the literature on experimental governance (type g) in the list discussed in section 
1), social and deliberative learning (type e), and the discursive-argumentative turn in public 
policy that emphasizes the transformative potential of framing (type f) Most of this literature 
has normative assumptions or, at least, shares an interest in identifying the conditions for 
‘good’ or ‘participatory’ governance. However, scholars working within the advocacy 
coalitions approach have pinned down the conditions for reflexive learning across coalitions 
without relying on normative assumptions (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). 
2. Let us now consider another of the most important lenses on learning, the epistemic 
communities tradition. Taken in its broadest sense, this lens covers experts in governments 
and international organizations, the political role of lawyers and economists in public policy 
and ‘palace wars’ (Delazay and Bryant, 2002), the politics of knowledge utilization carried 
out by social and natural scientists for agencies and departments (Boswell, 2008; Author A, 
2007, 2009, 2010; Haas, 1992; Stone, 2005; Schrefler, 2010; Stolfi, 2010). Most of this 
literature revolves around the question whether rationality, science, and experts bring about 
change in public policy, and if so via what type of instruments, organisational settings, or 
institutional devices.
ii
 We have seen that there are different variations within this tradition, but 
there is no doubt that they have a common core grounded in the notions of communities of 
experts with shared causal policy beliefs and a paradigm of public policy. It follows that we 
can start the re-construction of the field with a typology containing epistemic communities as 
one genus. We also have some expectations that there are species within this genus – as 
shown by the different declinations of the research on learning and epistemic communities 
(types a, b and c). 
3. Thirdly, we identify the genus of learning as a product of bargaining and social interaction, 
often as the un-intended product of dense systems of interaction between politicians and 
bureaucrats (Liberatore, 1999). Three themes in the literature fit this profile – the species of 
interaction in loosely-coupled organizations and political systems (mentioned under type k), 
strategic forms of learning (type i), and, arguably, learning ‘under conditionality 
requirements’ (type h). 
4. When reflexivity is constrained and bargaining limited by strong hierarchical mechanisms we 
exit the rather pluralistic world of the reflexivity and bargaining genera. We enter a fourth 
genus characterised by learning in the shadow of hierarchy. There are several 
characterisations of the shadow (Börzel, 2010; Falkner, 2011 forthcoming; for the original 
approach see Scharpf, 1988, 1997). But, most of these studies focus on the shadow of 
organisations/institutions creating pressure to learn (as in type j) and/or the shadow of 
hierarchy where learning is part of a delegation chain (type d). 
Explanatory typologies map the variables behind the cells. Having reflected on the four 
genera, what are the dimensions that shape the four cells? We argue that there are two dimensions 
with which to construct a mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive explanatory typology. These 
dimensions are prominent in the literature on social mechanisms and mechanisms of learning 
(Hedström, 2005; Liberatore, 1999). 
The first concerns the level of uncertainty or problem tractability. There is a consistent body 
of literature in international relations, risk assessment and public policy that points to uncertainty as 
main discriminatory factor between ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ learning, and between processes that can be 
handled with technical or technocratic approaches and ‘contested boundaries’ that become ultimately 
political (Checkel, 1998; Jasanoff, 1987). Think of epistemic communities (Haas, 1992). Absent 
uncertainty, the epistemic actors have very little to say since elected policymakers and their 
bureaucracies can calculate the pay-offs of different courses of action (Moravcsik, 1999). 
The second is less explicit. Yet, it seems clear that the genera vary in relation to the authority 
and legitimacy of some key actors or venues. The key question lies in mechanisms of actor's 
certification. McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) have shown that this is a key mechanism of social 
action. If we ‘translate’ this key mechanism in the language of learning theory, the issue is whether 
there is a sort of 'teacher' that can be easily identified by the learners and enjoys some social 
legitimacy. To illustrate, teachers and narrators can be trusted because they have institutional roles or 
are endorsed by elected policymakers (Jones and McBeth, 2010). Or we can conjecture that 
institutional structures provide legitimacy and make a specific teacher heard – or withdraw legitimacy 
and silence those who speak from outside institutional fora. What was said, and how this is received 
by the 'pupils', depends on the institutional position of the teacher. Organizational roles and 
institutional rules and fora are the classic place to look for the mechanisms of an actor's certification. 
Of course, learning also takes place in ‘structureless’ environments. For example, the literature on 
reflexivity does not recognize any ex-ante certification of types of actors – often major innovations 
come from tapping into the benefits of local knowledge, not ‘from the top’. We can also conjecture 
that there are pluralistic polyarchic settings where no-one is a pre-defined teacher and all actors are 
virtually able to play the role of learner. In these settings, learning has a relational quality (Fischer, 
2003). 
Taken together, the two dimensions provide our basic model of policy learning and four 
genera (see figure 1). 
FIGURE 1 GOES HERE 
 
3. EXPANDING THE PROPERTY SPACE 
Typological theory is particularly useful in qualitative studies, but its role is wider since it assists with 
concept formation, a step that is logically prior to measurement and therefore affects quantitative as 
well as qualitative studies (George and Bennett, 2005: chpt. 11). There is also a strong connection 
between the classification steps across the ladder of abstraction and the notion of ‘expanding the 
property space’ in typological theory (Elman, 2005), although this connection has not been fully 
exploited yet. We use the expansion step to highlight the differentia among species. To be 
‘explanatory’, however, a typological expansion has to be grounded in theory. We expand each cell 
using the findings of education studies of learning as control over knowledge production (Mocker and 
Spear, 1982, for a political science application of this adult learning typology see Author A, 2009). 
Mocker and Spear point to two dimensions: (a) control over the objectives of learning and (b) 
control over the means and specific content of learning; that is, why one learns and what one learns. 
Mocker and Spear’s typology of adult learning has four types. We use them consistently when we 
expand the property space. The four types are self-directed learning, informal learning, non-formal 
learning, and formal learning (see figure 2). 
Because their typology is constructed upon empirical reality, as well as theoretical 
assumptions of intended rationality, Mocker and Spear’s descriptions of learning are well-grounded 
and involve a sufficiently low degree of abstraction that captures specific learning dynamics whose 




 Self-directed learning is individualized and experiential. Here, learning is unstructured and 
driven by the learner. With their learning unrestricted by any disciplinary silos or paradigms and pre-
determined goals, learners enjoy control over all aspects of learning seeking out knowledge from a 
variety of sources, constructing the problem and establishing their own solutions in their own time; 
‘learning what they want for as long as they want and stopping when they want’ (Rogers, 2004). In its 
most extreme form, self-directed learning can result in learners both adjudicating and creating 
evidence rejecting that possibility that any expertise is superior to their own (Rogers, 2002, p.275). 
More usually, knowledge creation here is not entirely autodidactic, notably learners in the self-
directed mode may take advice from a range of teachers on the veracity of the information they find 
(Hiemstra, 1994). They do not however identify with a single actor to inform the content and direction 
of policy. There are no single paradigms or knowledge hierarchies to structure what is learned by 
policymakers. 
 Informal learning treats learners as task-conscious. Here learning is not enlightenment for its 
own sake but rather revolves around assembling the means to dispatch a specific task which has been 
effectively set for them (Rogers, 2003, pp.18-21). While the learner directs the selection and 
production of substantive resources, the presence of externally determined policy goals bound this 
scope for choice; the development of ‘know-how’ requires that learners are conscious of extrinsic 
evaluation where the substantive arguments they amass will be assessed in terms of goals that are 
determined by other actors. 
 Formal learning refers to externally imposed learning where the learner’s control over both 
the substantive content of knowledge and ends to which it is applied is severely constrained (Coombs 
and Ahmed, 1974). Learning here takes the form of guided episodes from teacher to learner where 
there is acceptance on both sides that learning needs to occur (Rogers, 2002, p.279). 
 Non-formal learning refers to situations where information is moulded to learners’ own 
circumstances and the teacher’s role is that of facilitator. Here, learners’ awareness of what they want 
to do with what they learn ensures that their engagement with codified knowledge is mediated by pre-
existing expectations for determining the use or success of that knowledge (Heimlich, 1993; Tough, 
1971). For non-formal learning to be identified, evidence is required of decision-makers’ dependence 
on, for example, epistemic communities for the delivery, legitimization or justification policy 
preferences that have been formed independently of their relationship with these experts. 
FIGURE 2 GOES HERE 
 
By using control over the contents of learning and control over the goals of learning we can then 
generate four cells out of each cell of the basic model of figure 1. This is the step of ‘expanding the 
property space’ (Elman, 2005). By way of expansion, we create sixteen species out of the four genera. 
The fact that we have started with a loose map of eleven species and we end up with sixteen simply 
means that some species, although conceptually possible, have not been empirically found yet (or we 
have not been able to find the articles that clearly map onto them). This way we systematize what is 
already known and also show the territory that is empirical possible, if as yet unexplored.  
There is yet another benefit in the expansion of the property space. The expansion shows the 
variability within the four genera. Instead of treating reflexivity, epistemic communities, bargaining 
and ‘the shadow’ as monoliths, we explore the scope conditions for them to occur and the nuances 
possible within a single genus. 
 
a) Reflexive Learning 
We first expand the cells of the reflexive learning genus, using figure 3. Recall that, for reflexive 
learning to occur, uncertainty has to be high and the certification of specific actors low. In this genus 
or type (that is, reflexive learning) the classic distinction between learner and teacher does not make 
sense. There is no pre-identified hierarchical role in terms of learning and no presupposition about 
who should learn from whom. Learning is the outcome of a social relation within a community of 
actors or a network (see Freeman 2006 on the difference between the two). Institutions do not set 
hierarchical rules for the production and utilization of knowledge. 
The distribution of power is polyarchic, and there has to be room for force-free deliberation, 
at least in the pure type discussed by the literature on reflective social governance. Preferences can 
change as a result of communicative rationality. There is no ex-ante hypothesis about where the seeds 
of learning may germinate (lay knowledge is as important as professional and expert knowledge for 
reflexive dynamics to occur). The major problem is how to diffuse innovation and the seeds of 
learning across the community or network that is engaged with learning. This is why reflexive 
learning is often accompanied by governance architectures that facilitate the exploitation of this type 
of learning (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2008, for example refer to architectures of facilitated coordination). 
FIGURE 3 GOES HERE 
 
Deliberation (type e) of the eleven discussed in section 1) is arguably the most classic form of 
reflexivity (it is bold and underlined in figure 3); learning is not deduction, but the outcome of a 
process of communication, persuasion, and invention. The constellation of actors is, as it were, its 
own principal. It can pursue enlightenment for its own sake. It can reflexively modify preferences 
without exogenous constraints. Since preferences can change, the objectives of learning are dynamic 
and endogenous to the process of social interaction. In this specification, 'policy' is not something 
'finished' out there that has to be learned by the constellation of actors (Freeman, 2006). Policy, 
instead, is finished and, even produced, in the act of learning. 
            Reflexivity is constrained in experimental learning (type g). There cannot be enlightenment for 
its own sake but rather is bound up with the ideal of democratic polyarchies. Reflexivity is anchored 
to the task set for the community of learners – the task or end is exogenous. However, the 
constellation of actors has control over the means and contents of what is being learned. We can think 
of experimental processes of trial-and-error with different forms of know-how and policy instruments, 
where Bayesian learning leads to the type of content that best suits the exogenous learning goal. 
             In framing (type f) the learning experience is contingent on how the learners frame their 
problem. Since they have no control over the means and content of learning, the learning experience 
will operate through issue framing in the context of a given over-arching goal. Framing in the context 
of exogenous objectives can also lead to learning as delivery, legitimation, and justification. 
Reflexivity can also fail and produce zero learning if the mechanisms of learning do not fit with the 
pre-existing objectives of learning – put differently, there may be mismatch. 
            Though we did not identify it in our trawl of the literature on policy learning, a fourth 
conceptually possible species is highlighted by the expansion. Where learning is evolutionary, it takes 
place in communities or networks where there are no pre-defined teachers. Learning has to occur on 
all sides since the objectives are pre-determined exogenously. Reflexivity is limited or bound because 
the objectives of learning are not controlled by the constellation of actors. The constellation has 
another limitation: it cannot control the means and contents of learning. We are therefore reducing the 
scope of reflexivity to its minimal properties. We can think of evolutionary mechanisms that force the 
community/network of actors to learn – otherwise they do not survive. Although constrained, the 
actors can still be reflexive and modify their preferences to avoid what for them is a doomsday 
scenario. 
 
b) Epistemic Communities 
Let us move to the species in the epistemic community genus in figure 4. Recall that we need high 
actor certification and low problem tractability for this genus to operate. By expanding the property 
space, we find a classic (for this literature) species of formal learning (it is bold and underlined in 
figure 4, called ‘expert as teacher’) and three other species.  
 ‘Expert as teacher’ (type a) of our eleven) is classic in that, the literature on epistemic 
communities has implicitly identified this as the ideal-typical form epistemic learning (Haas, 1992). 
Since epistemic actors are socially certified teachers, or there are characteristics of the venue that 
produce certification (such as mandatory consultation of experts before decisions are taken or 
delegation of power to expert's committees), we have a clear teacher-learner relation. The epistemic 
community assumes the role of teacher and provides both the broad ends of the learning exercise and 
the substantive means (Author A, 2009, p.292). This way, epistemic communities reduce uncertainty 
and contribute to the definition of actor's interests.  
FIGURE 4 GOES HERE 
 
At the opposite, we find the 'agent' as the weakest species in the genus of epistemic learning (type c). 
In this specification, policymakers are the principal. The epistemic actors are agents – they are 
effectively controlled by their principals (see Author A, 2010). The scientist, or more generally the 
epistemic actor, is an efficiency device in that this actor reduces the information deficit of the 
principal. Here the teacher is very much piloted by the learner, and this also affects the modalities of 
knowledge utilization; only knowledge that is directly useful to the principal is used. Learning is 
directed and intentional. 
Next we have the ’facilitator’ (type b). In this species, learners use their teachers to facilitate 
their process of learning. The epistemic actors are facilitators; they do not contribute to the definition 
of the interests of the learner. The learner engages with the teacher and learns, but knowledge 
utilization is subordinate to a context of pre-determined expectations set by the teacher. Think of a 
pre-determined goal to use knowledge about public expenditure produced by a new monitoring 
system of public accounts to reduce the overall public budget for the next year. 
The last quadrant we examine in figure 3 is the producer of know-how. This is the conceptual 
‘dark side’ of epistemic communities – as yet empirically unexplored. Here the learner organizes the 
production and selection of knowledge. However, there are learning objectives that are determined 
exogenously. It follows that knowledge production and utilization will be assessed in terms of 
objectives that are determined outside the relationship between the teacher and the learner. For 
example, a department or public organization sets up mechanisms of knowledge production by 
experts committees, but in the presence of an exogenous political objective such as a coalition 
agreement to introduce rights for migrant workers. The essence of the learning experience is about 
producing technical know-how that can fit in with the pre-existing objectives. 
 
c) Bargaining 
Turning to bargaining, this genus has high problem tractability and low or no actors' certification. 
Bargaining produces learning as the un-intended product of political competition and negotiations as 
in Lindblom’s partisan mutual adjustment. Yet again, we do not have neat separation between the 
teacher and the learner (low actor's certification). The tractability of the problem (low uncertainty) 
facilitates bargaining and strategic interaction since the pay-offs of different moves can be calculated 
by actors whose preferences do not change. 
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We mention that it is conventional to think of the Lindblomian notion of the intelligence of 
democracy (Lindblom, 1965) as the ideal-typical manifestation of bargaining approaches to learning 
(though empirically we could find no studies where partisan mutual adjustment is the key mechanism 
of learning). 
          Moving to the next species – conditionality (type h) of our eleven) – we find a degree of 
coercion to meet certain objectives of learning – which are determined exogenously.  Actors bargain 
to meet standards and targets, and in doing so, they informally encounter learning in the shape of 
know-how and possibly discover smarter policymaking procedures or instruments. One way this may 
happen is when actors are pressured by conditionality requirements – the literature has shown that 
'smart' and 'clever' solutions are facilitated by the imperatives of conditionality. Learning under 
conditionality can also help actors to get smarter in another way, that is, to get around the formal 
conditionality requirements and 'use' standards and targets to their benefit. 
          The next cell is loosely-coupled learning (type k). There are no pre-defined teachers and 
learners – the model is contingent on a pluralist vision of the policy process where n actors interact 
with given preferences. The actors do not control the objectives of learning. Neither do they control 
the contents and means of learning. They interact and encounter learning in a very un-structured or 
loosely coupled format. It is difficult to predict how learning can occur, and when it takes place. Here, 
instances of failed learning (failure to use bargaining to learn) will be common, as well as episodes of 
un-intended learning (Liberatore, 1999). 
          The fourth bargaining species involves a strategic approach to learning (type i). The 
constellation of actors do not exercise control over the means of learning, thus there will be a certain 
degree of improvisation in this learning process. Bargaining can show how to acquire know-how, or it 
can produce failed learning. This, however, does not mean that the trajectory of learning is confused. 
The actors involved in the process can set their own goals – they are strategic about where they want 
to go with their learning process. 
 
d) The “Shadow” 
The 'shadow' is our last genus to be expanded into four cells (figure 6). High problem tractability (low 
uncertainty) and high certification of actors or/and venues characterize the shadow. As mentioned, the 
original intuition of the shadow was linked to the problem-solving bottlenecks of German federalism 
and the European Community of the 1970s, as examined by Scharpf (1988). The idea is that 
interaction in complex systems with multiple veto-players creates 'joint-decision trap' blockages. 
However, the presence of default conditions (that is, what happens if agreement is not found) 
generates agreement under certain conditions. To illustrate, within a given system of interaction, the 
actors may learn that their default condition is the intervention of a hierarchical, irreversible decision 
by a Court (Schmidt, 2000). This kind of Damocles' sword alters the attitude of governments in the 
EU Council to the point of overcoming joint-decision traps, especially if the threat of the Court is 
brought about by purposeful bureaucratic actors like the European Commission (Schmidt, 2000). 
            The 'shadow' is not necessarily produced by a Court. We can think more generally of political 
institutions that when present, alter the default condition with their rules, codes of behaviour, 
memories and organizational logic. Institutions can either provide 'rules of the game' (in the sense of 
the rational-choice version of the shadow articulated by Scharpf) or codes, identities, collective 
memories, lock-in mechanisms and roles that also alter the default condition, but through the logic of 
appropriateness of organizational sociology. 
            Thus, in contrast to the large (rational-choice inspired) majority of the work on the shadow 
(for the different approaches see Héritier and Rhodes, 2010; Falkner, 2011), there is room for a 
sociological version. We do not make distinctions between sociological or rational choice 
understandings of institutions here, since the emphasis is on the properties of social interactions. 
Neither do we distinguish between acting in the shadow of hierarchy or within hierarchy, since the 
implications for our typological exercise are the same. 
             What about learners and teachers under the shadow? There is a kind of teacher-learner 
relationship but this has less to do with specific actors (such as the experts, the scientists etc) and 
more with the content of institutional rules. Institutions 'teach' roles via socialization and/or are 
channels through which rules are taught to the actors in the system of interaction. 
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This is the genus whose expansion requires most imagination: indeed, two of the four ‘shadows’ are 
conceptually possible but not empirically demonstrable from our review of the literature.  
             But, let’s start with a species we have found. Where learning is instrumental (type j) of our 
eleven), learners operate within exogenous objectives of learning, but they do control the means and 
content of learning. The shadow provides clues on what to do with learning. It structures interaction 
among learners. There is pressure to learn (in turn, pressure can come from the organization, political 
competition in government, elections, and so on) but the logic of discovery is relatively free in 
relation to the means and content. This should facilitate instrumental learning and marginal 
improvement at the level of the tools of government and the instruments of public policy. 
             The second species we found is that of delegation (type d). Here, learners set their learning 
objectives autonomously, but are constrained as to the contents and means of learning. Here the 
shadow can be a resource used to organize the production and dissemination of knowledge. The vast 
literature on principal-agent models has show different ways in which knowledge production, 
utilization and diffusion can be organized along a chain of delegation of tasks. The learners design the 
tasks by remaining in control of the objectives of learning. 
             And now, to the dark sides. We propose the idea of ‘hetero-directed learning’ as the ideal-
typical or classic way of thinking about the shadow (bottom-right quadrant in figure 6) since it 
typifies the essence of steering. Learners are entirely driven by the shadow since they cannot control 
either the means of learning or the objectives. This type of severely bound learning takes place in 
highly institutionalized environments. Learning is reduced to coping with instructions; a type of 
learning by rote about procedures, roles, and memorizing of doing things. 
             Autonomy is almost antithetical to the essence of hierarchy represented by the 'hetero-
directed' cell. Indeed, ‘autonomy’ is the weakest specification ever possible of any shadow. True, we 
assume that the learners still operate within the shadow – think of domestic policymakers 
implementing EU directives in the shadow of Community law. But they can decide autonomously 
what they want to learn and how. To continue with the example, they can try to learn how not to 
goldplate directives and which regulatory instruments to use in implementation. It is almost an 'escape 
from hierarchy' scenario where the learners are relatively autonomous in a given structure of 




What do we gain from the typological exercise, then? What does it really 'show'? How can it be used? 
To begin with, let us think of the typology in the same way we approach hypertexts. At the most 
abstract level, we have four concepts that typify how political scientists have approached the study of 
learning: they are reflexivity, the epistemic school, the bargaining-pluralist approach, and institutional 
or rule-based modes of analysis. This is a broad map that sheds light on how the various schools of 
thought approach learning from radically different assumptions concerning preference formation, 
hierarchy, and the ontological question of whether learning is an asymmetric relation between 
teachers of pupils or a highly interactive process. Further, it is obvious that whilst some look at macro 
processes involving negotiations among states or broad trends in policy convergence, others deal with 
micro processes, organizations, and communities of policy makers (Zito and Schout, 2009b, pp.1103). 
            Thus, at this abstract level, the map can be used to generate meta-theories of policy learning. 
Meta-theory is concerned with the sociology of knowledge, the ontological dimension of theories, and 
the core epistemological propositions. Applied to policy learning, a meta-theoretical approach exposes 
the different ontological assumptions and the core epistemological beliefs of different social scientists 
engaged with learning in public policy. It shows why and how different areas of the discipline are 
genuinely after 'different things' because of their understandings of the social and political worlds. 
Within the higher-level map, propositions such as ‘learning contrasts with rational policy theories in 
which optimal policy conclusions are derived from static analysis’ (Zito and Schout, 2009b, pp.1104) 
do not make sense, since we can produce rational-choice learning theories derived from an ontology 
that is social (meaning that the policy objects are socially constructed via meanings attached to events 
and problems) and an epistemology that is objective, but accounts for information that is costly. 
             To proceed with the metaphor of the hypertext, we can then metaphorically click on any of 
the four concepts and find more detail when we expand the property space. Here our major finding is 
to show bias in what has been done until now. Most of the research has gone in some cells but others 
have been neglected. Yet all the cells, from the point of view of pure logic, have the same status and 
deserve the same attention. It follows that there are areas were we need to drill more, such as the cells 
of the ‘producer of know how’, ‘intelligence of democracy’, ‘evolutionary patterns of learning’, and 
the odd but potentially intriguing cells of ‘autonomy’, and ‘hetero-directed’ learning. At the opposite 
side of the spectrum, we find cells such as ‘delegation’ and ‘deliberative’ learning that are never short 
of scholarly attention. In brief, the typological exercise shows where high-risk but potentially 
rewarding investment of research time and energy should be made. It also shows how some fields in 
the discipline of learning navigate pretty well across the cells. Arguably the best example is the 
literature on policy diffusion, which, depending on the emphasis on herding or strategic behavior, can 
be classified in one cell or another. For diffusion scholars, our exercise is relevant because it makes 
clear how different studies have refracted the phenomenon of diffusion by using alternatives 
conceptualizations of learning, and ultimately have generated different results. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Scholars working on learning tend to talk past each other because they do not realize the difference 
between genus and species; because they do not see the variables that connect one type to others; and 
because they measure learning with different types of bias (Author B, 2009). This article has 
illustrated the relationships between the genera in the basic model of policy learning, and expanded 
the property space by showing different characterisations of the individual species. As a result, we 
reveal that concepts such as ‘reflexive learning’ and ‘epistemic communities’ are not monoliths: they 
can be disaggregated to make them amenable to fine-grained empirical analysis. Classificatory 
analysis provides maps and toolboxes, and clarifies concepts that are often confused.  
             We proceeded by combining the classic Sartorian approach to classification with explanatory 
typologies. This blend has enabled us to find different mechanisms and relations associated with 
alternatives operationalizations of learning and the role of actors in the process of knowledge 
construction and utilization. In this way, we hope to show how the field of policy learning can be 
usefully reconstructed and analysis ordered. The aim of this exercise is to lay the foundations for the 
systematic comparison across and within cases. 
             Another result was to make explicit the theoretical assumptions we make when we move from 
one genus to others. Our preference is for theories of knowledge utilization, and for a blend of politics 
and sociology on one hand, and the education literature on the other. We have said that the choice of 
looking at knowledge utilization is an asset, but for other researchers this might be a liability since it 
narrows down learning to specific processes involving knowledge. Future research may well question 
our theoretical choice, and move from different frameworks to map learning. Another possible avenue 
for future research is to move towards empirical exploration of processes and mechanisms, and 
establish whether a given policy domain can move from one cell to another, and if so why. This will 
also enable researchers to make sense of the different roles of agency and structure in the dynamics of 
learning. Finally, there are possible normative explorations of our types. Given a constellation of 
actors and problems in a policy domain, what is the most appropriate type of learning? Policy 
designers may use our explanatory typologies to try to move a given constellation from 'experimental' 
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i  We searched in the ISI Social Science Citation index on 16 May 2011 with the following criteria: Topic=(Policy learning) OR 
Topic=(organizational learning) OR Topic=(social learning) AND TOPIC=(Public Policy) AND Topic=(Learning). We then refined by 
subject areas International Relations OR Public Administration OR Political Science OR Law OR Sociology OR Urban Studies. This 
produced an initial sample of 833 articles. 730 articles were rejected from this sample through a search for duplicates (26), low citation 
counts (5 and under, 430) and two abstract sifts (270 and 31 articles were rejected respectively). The main reasons for the rejection of non-
duplicated papers were papers that focused on learning between non-state actors or actors outwith the political sphere; those which used the 
term learning in a purely descriptive way; those for whom ‘more’ or ‘better’ learning was a prescriptive punchline, and finally, those studies 
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